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Course Correction
My term at Afghanistan’s graduate school of war.
G a n e s h S i ta r a m a n

Can the U.S. military learn about counterinsurgency quickly enough to save Kabul—and the rest of Afghanistan?

C

amp Julien is surrounded by reminders of
Afghanistan’s past. The coalition military base—
which sits in the hills south of Kabul, just high
enough to rise above the thick cloud of smog that
perpetually blankets the city—is flanked by two
European-style palaces built in the 1920s by the modernizing
King Amanullah. Home to Soviet troops and mujahedin during the past decades of war, the now-crumbling palaces are littered with bullet holes and decorated with graffiti in multiple
languages. Uphill from Julien is the old Russian officers’ club,
dating from the Soviet invasion and featuring a recently refilled
swimming pool that overlooks the southern half of the city.
The pool is said to have been the site of executions in the 1990s;
the condemned were apparently shot off the diving board.
The project underway at Camp Julien aims to help the United
States and its allies succeed where King Amanullah, the Russians,
and even the mujahedin failed. Julien is home to the Counterinsurgency Training Center–Afghanistan, where U.S. and coalition
forces are trying to teach themselves and Afghans how to fight
a different kind of war. For one week each month, 130 students
descend on Julien to learn about counterinsurgency. Attendees
come from every possible background: U.S. and coalition troops
of all ranks, ages, and nationalities; State Department and usaid
C h a d Hun t

personnel; Afghan soldiers and police; members of NGOs; contractors; Army anthropologists. (I was there in July as part of my
research on law in situations of counterinsurgency.)
Overseeing the center is an American colonel named John
Agoglia. The Brooklyn native is both impossibly considerate
and, at six feet and 215 pounds, incredibly imposing—a fact
compounded by his loud, decisive manner. “No one here is a
subject-matter expert in counterinsurgency,” he announces to
his students on the first day of their course. “If you think you’re
an expert, it indicates to me you’ve stopped learning, don’t have
an open mind, and you should leave. We’re all students here.”
His strength, he told me, lies not in creating ideas but in synthesizing them. The result is that Agoglia presides over something akin to the Aspen Ideas Festival of Afghanistan. Sitting
around a campfire or in the center’s small, plywood-walled conference room, groups one would never expect to see together
talk late into the night about counterinsurgency theory or metrics for measuring the efficacy of development aid. Agoglia’s
staff contributes to this vibrancy. His 15 instructors include
French and Australian officers, as well as U.S. troops with varied experiences. Their offices are filled with books on counterinsurgency operations and Afghan history—from the conqueror
Babur’s memoirs to histories of the British-Afghan wars of the
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nineteenth century. Julien may not fit
the image of an ordinary military installation, but counterinsurgency has long
been considered atypical—the province
of warrior-scholars like General David
Petraeus (who has a Ph.D. from Princeton) or John Nagl (a Rhodes Scholar with
a doctorate from Oxford). Indeed, the
Army and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual opens with what has
become a popular epigram: “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.”
This more sophisticated style of warfare is now central to Afghanistan’s future. General Stanley McChrystal, who
oversees the coalition effort in the country, issued a tactical directive in early July
to his forces. It was a striking document
that effectively reversed the central theory of the great wars of the twentieth century—destroy the military and the will of
the people. Instead, McChrystal told the
troops that “we will not win based on the
number of Taliban we kill,” and he cautioned against using air attacks because
they might cause civilian casualties. An
alienated population, he argued, would
threaten the mission’s success. More recently, McChrystal has identified another
tenet of counterinsurgency as a crucial
objective in the fight for Afghanistan: improving governance at all levels. As counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen
has noted, “a government that is losing
to an insurgency is not being outfought,
it is being outgoverned.”
Now, President Obama must decide
whether to give McChrystal the additional troops he is requesting to carry out
this strategy. Before he does, he will have
to determine whether he thinks counterinsurgency can truly succeed in Afghanistan. And the answer to that question
hinges partly on whether our military
can learn this type of warfare, and learn
it quickly. “I expect our force to internalize and operate in accordance with my
intent,” McChrystal wrote in his July directive. “Following this intent requires
a cultural shift within our forces—and
complete understanding at every level—
down to the most junior soldiers.” An entirely new mindset is a tall order for a
massive bureaucracy. If you want a sense
of whether it can be done, there is no
better place to visit than Camp Julien—
Afghanistan’s graduate school of war.

‘H

ow many of you have read
David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice?” Lt. Colonel Matt Galton, the deputy
director of the center, asked in his Australian accent. Two hands slowly went

up. It was not surprising. Though Galula’s
book is a—possibly the—classic starting
point for counterinsurgency, it was written over 40 years ago and isn’t required
reading. More troubling, when Galton
asked how many had read the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, only about five
hands went up.
This was surprising, given how pervasive, even trendy, counterinsurgency has
become in policy circles. In the nearly
three years since the release of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, its authors
have gone on to fame, at least in the public policy world: Nagl appeared on “The
Daily Show”; Kilcullen is a frequent television commentator; and Petraeus, the lead
author of the manual, is now the head of
U.S. Central Command—in charge of the
military’s operations in the Middle East.
But, despite the coaches’ rise to prominence, most of the players haven’t read
the playbook.
“I didn’t even know counterinsurgency
was a term,” Lieutenant Aaron Lewis
said of his tour of duty in Iraq in 2004
and 2005. “I felt something was wrong
with what we were doing . . . but I didn’t
know what.” Born in Silver City, New
Mexico—the home of Billy the Kid, he
noted—Lewis had been a bored college
student studying political science at
New Mexico State University. When it
came time to declare a major, he decided
he wasn’t ready. “I didn’t know what I
wanted to do with my life. I hadn’t really
done anything yet. How could I make
that decision?”
After enlisting in the Army, Lewis
served a tour in Kandahar in 2002 and a
tour in Iraq. “The Army should be proactive, but we were reactive in Iraq,” he
said. “We just didn’t know what to do.”
Lewis is naturally inquisitive and curious; he asked more questions than any
other student in the course, and often the
hardest and most pointed ones. Now an
officer, Lewis had tried to learn more
about counterinsurgency, reading on
his own, talking to peers about their experiences, and volunteering for courses
like this one. But, prior to deploying
to Afghanistan, he had little counterinsurgency training, and he found that
counterinsurgency still carried a stigma
among members of armor and maneuver units, who prefer the straightforward
nature of conventional warfare to the nuance and discretion required for successful counterinsurgency. “The challenge for
the Army is that the Counterinsurgency
Field Manual expresses a mindset—it’s
as close as the Army gets to philosophy.
And we’re not good at teaching that,”
Lewis said. “You can tell someone how
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far the rifle shoots, but you can’t really do
the same with counterinsurgency.”
Still, Agoglia’s instructors must try. On
the first day alone, students see dozens
of slides, capturing a century of counterinsurgency theory. Some are impossibly
complicated. The conflict ecosystem and
the support structures for insurgency
look like the animal food chain from elementary school biology class—arrows in
every direction showing feedback loops,
backlash effects, and the interconnections of the social system needed to sustain an insurgency.
“Security, governance, and development,”
Captain Mike Barry announced with the
ease and authority of a second-tour officer who now spends his days reading
about counterinsurgency. “These are the
three pillars of counterinsurgency. This
is how you win the population.” When
groups of students assembled around
him during the week, Agoglia frequently
told them that governance was the most
important of the three. “I’m an infantryman telling you that,” he joked, “so it must
be true!” Yet, on the first day, many of the
students chafed upon hearing that they
might have to do what the military calls
“civil affairs.” “We’re not trained to do governance and development,” one young officer said. Another chimed in: “Shouldn’t
the State Department and others be doing
this? This isn’t our job.”
Agoglia runs a tight ship and would
not let the group move on until the dissenters at least acknowledged his point:
“We have limited resources. There aren’t
enough people from the State Department or usaid to do these operations. So
we have two choices: Either we don’t do
it and risk the mission, or we step up to
the plate and take on the challenge.” The
dissenters recognized that they were beat
and finally caved when Agoglia appealed
to their honor as soldiers. “In my Army,
we get the job done,” he said. “Whatever
it takes.”

O

ne key tenet of counterinsurgency is that you need to understand the local population.
Spending time at Camp Julien made clear
that we still have a long way to go on that
front. When an Afghan interpreter asked
the students during a presentation how
many read the local papers, listened to
local radio, or had someone translate or
brief them on the local news each day,
about a dozen (out of 130) raised their
hands. In a debriefing session later that
day, a group of young officers asked why
their commanders didn’t require everyone to follow the local news. Another officer said he had met fellow officers who

explained that they were too busy to sit
down over tea with village elders in order
to build strong relationships; they only
had time for official meetings.
But the problem runs deeper than just
keeping up with local news or having
the requisite cups of tea with residents.
Instructors at Julien worried about the
fear of casualties—particularly the fear
of IEDs—pushing troops and civilians to
stay on their bases as much as possible.
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual rejects this approach, noting, in perhaps its
most difficult paradox, that “sometimes,
the more you protect your force, the less
secure you may be.” In the long run, the
security of the base is a mirage: It leaves
the population constantly at risk and increases the danger to soldiers whenever
they venture out. And it prevents soldiers
from understanding the people they are
trying to protect.
One of the center’s priorities is teaching
students tools for quickly understanding
a local community. Students use the acronym ascope to identify the Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People,
and Events in a particular province, district, or village. After my small group did
an ascope analysis for Herat province
in western Afghanistan, we realized not
only how much counterinsurgents need
to know about an area but also how little
we knew—despite the fact that much of
the group was deployed in Herat. Most
conceded that they probably couldn’t do
an ascope for their home state back in
the United States or Europe. How many
knew the names of their local politicians
or the most important economic and social leaders in the state? How many knew
the location and status of the relevant
infrastructure—water treatment plants,
hospitals, utility providers? Like politics,
all counterinsurgency is local.
Even the most conscientious efforts
to connect with Afghans can sometimes
go awry. During my time at Julien, an
Afghan National Army general—a soldier throughout the last three decades
of war—was invited to the base to give
a talk on insurgency. After a 20-minute
discussion of the differences between violent and peaceful demonstrations and
how the police should deal with them, I
saw Agoglia write “WTF?!” in his notebook. The general was in the army, not
the police; why was he talking about how
to manage demonstrators? I had thought
he was describing possible courses of action if the upcoming elections led to protests. But it was nothing so clever. In Dari,
Afghanistan’s most widely spoken language, the words for “demonstration” and
“insurgency” are similar, and the general’s

staff thought the request was for a talk on
demonstrations, not insurgency. A minor
error in translation, but one that signified
the magnitude of the challenge. The professionals at Camp Julien can teach counterinsurgency as well as possible, but in
Afghanistan, the lack of local knowledge
continually risks disaster.

L

ike any good graduate school,
the counterinsurgency center at Julien is interested not just in teaching but in cutting-edge research. This
summer, Agoglia and British Brigadier
Neil Baverstock created a new program,
under which civilian academic researchers could spend a few weeks or longer
at Camp Julien, using the base as their
jumping-off point for field research in
Afghanistan. (I visited Julien as a participant in this program.)
Professors Eli Berman of the University of California, San Diego, and Jason
Lyall of Yale were at the base during my
time there. Berman and Lyall are part of
a team conducting a multi-country study
on the relationship between development programs and violence. Throughout the military, development agencies
like usaid, and academia, there is a general assumption that economic development reduces violence. The basic idea is
that development programs create wellbeing, and those who are well-off are less
likely to join an insurgency. The evidence,
however, is largely anecdotal, and no
one knows which programs get the biggest bang for their buck. Is it road construction or irrigation projects? Building
schools or drilling wells?
In an earlier study, Berman (collaborating with Jacob Shapiro of Princeton and
Colonel Joseph Felter of Stanford) looked
at development spending in Iraq through
the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (cerp), a discretionary fund
available to military commanders. They
found that, prior to the surge, cerp
spending was insignificant in reducing
violence. If the theory was that spending
always improves security, it failed. Only
after the surge, with an increased security presence and more contact between
U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians, did cerp
spending decrease violence.
Berman and Lyall are now proposing
the gold standard of social-science research for Afghanistan: a randomized
experiment. Usaid, commanders disbursing cerp money, and development
contractors often have to choose which
programs to spend their limited resources on. What Berman and Lyall suggest is that they use their discretion in a
way that enables the scholars to collect

data akin to that provided by a randomized medical trial. Once the programs are
completed, Berman and Lyall can crunch
the numbers and identify which projects
were successful under what conditions.
“It’s been a challenge, but we’re making
a lot of progress,” Berman told me. The
military has been supportive of their efforts. After all, if Berman and Lyall can
provide some sense of which programs
are working, their research could guide
smarter, more effective spending in the
future. “It’s not how much money you
spend,” Agoglia told me, “it’s how effective the program is in accomplishing
the goals. Right now, we only know how
much money we spend. We need these
guys to help us measure the effects.”
Though Berman and Lyall’s project is
promising, it is striking that, after eight
years in Afghanistan, no one actually
knows which development programs—
if any—reduce violence.

B

y the fifth day of the course,
the curriculum seemed to be working. The students were more focused on the population and understood
that thoughtful planning, non-military
operations, and patience were the keys
to success. Their mindset had shifted.
“It’s been incredible to see the younger
officers change their views and build on
each day’s lessons,” Colonel Jeanne Arnold, who leads an advisory group to one
of the U.S. commanders, told me. “I’ve
read a lot about counterinsurgency, but
I’m amazed at how fast these guys are
picking it up.”
Over the course of the next six months,
the counterinsurgency center at Julien
will expand. Yet there will still be a limit
to how many troops the center can train
at any given time. It’s been almost three
years since the Counterinsurgency Field
Manual appeared in print and two years
since General Petraeus helped make
counterinsurgency the most prominent
military strategy since containment. But,
for all the publicity, too few in the field
have truly internalized counterinsurgency. Agoglia and his staff are engaged in
a race to make up for lost time—a sprint
to change the mindset of the military before Afghanistan deteriorates further.
Toward the end of the course, I tracked
down Lieutenant Lewis. He was more
worried than when he had started the
week. “There are so many smart people
here with great ideas,” he said. “It sounds
like we know what to do. So what’s the
problem? What’s taking so long?” d
Ganesh Sitaraman is the Public Law Fellow
and a lecturer at Harvard Law School.
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